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This special edition of Africa Insight focuses 
on the African Union (AU) after a decade since 
its inception. The idea is to cast a critical eye 
over the past 10 years of the AU, successor 
to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), 
who will itself in 2013 commemorate 50 years 
since its establishment in 1963. Writing in 
May 2012, one of the chief architects of the 
AU and of Africa’s post-Cold War Continental 
Order, former South African president Thabo 
Mbeki remarked in the form of two probing 
questions:1
As we celebrate the first decade of both the 
AU and NEPAD, and prepare to celebrate the 
50th Anniversary of the OAU next year we must 
answer these questions honestly: 
 ● What progress have we made towards the 
achievement of the objectives of the OAU, 
the AU and NEPAD? And,
 ● What shall we do in this regard?
This special edition will respond to these 
questions, and critically gauge the continent’s 
peace and security, governance, development 
and cooperation architecture which have 
emerged over the past decade. To help unravel 
these questions, we were able to solicit arti-
cles from prominent analysts, not in the least 
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one of the chief architects of the new conti-
nental order, former South African President 
Thabo Mbeki, whose article in The Thinker of 
September 2012 is reprinted here with permis-
sion from the editor. Siphamandla Zondi does 
an analysis of the 2007 AU Audit Report and 
lessons to be learnt from it, while Tim Murithi 
gauges the continent’s emerging peace and se-
curity architecture. Deon Geldenhuys zooms 
in on the vexing sovereignty as responsibility 
debate in contemporary Africa, as he locates 
the debate in historical context. Francis Ikome 
interprets for us the implications of the so-
called ‘Arab Spring’, in particular the fall of 
Muammar Gaddafi and the anti-Mubarak in-
terventions in Egypt, and implications for AU 
agency and leadership. Hesphina Rukato asks 
probing questions about the past, present and 
future of the AU’s development programme, 
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD), while Chris Landsberg does a criti-
cal appraisal of NEPAD’s governance promo-
tion programme, the African Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM). The last contribution is 
by Gerrit Olivier, who probes the issue of part-
nership and cooperation between Africa and 
external powers, with specific reference to 
European Union (EU)-Africa relations. 
The collection of articles aims to explain the 
origins and nature of some of the continent’s 
key interstate institutions and relations, and 
their implications for continental peace and se-
curity, development and cooperation.
This scene-setting article deals essentially 
with what could be dubbed the ‘new’ wave of 
pan-Africanism underway in Africa – otherwise 
described here as the new ‘continentalism’.2 
There has been a policy revolution in Africa 
over the past decade. The continent boasts new 
norms, principles, values, mechanisms and 
structures that are fundamentally different 
from the ones which prevailed during the era 
of liberation and the struggle against white mi-
nority domination and apartheid in Africa. The 
continent’s state actors negotiated a new and 
progressive pan-Africanism, one that makes a 
fundamental break with the past as character-
ised by the period of the OAU.
The OAU placed a huge emphasis on unity, 
a struggle for political liberation and non-
interference in the domestic affairs of African 
states. In contrast, the ‘new’ wave of inter-Af-
rican cooperation puts the issues of develop-
ment, governance, democratisation, economic 
growth, and peace and security firmly on the 
continental agenda. It therefore espouses a pro-
gressive agenda that seeks to build consensus 
on African development, governance, and peace 
and security through articulating new norms, 
values, principles and policies, and designing 
institutional mechanisms for implementing the 
new paradigm. The 2007 African Union High-
level Panel Audit Report of 2007 argued that
… although inconsistent in some respects, the 
Constitutive Act allows Africa to move towards 
continental unity … Core values as set out in 
Article three of the Constitutive Act should be 
promoted, internalised and domesticated in all 
African countries and AU organs.3
Key leaders drove these African values, rules 
and processes and the ‘new African agenda’ 
was geared towards breaking away from the 
decade-old regime of ‘non-interference’, ‘non-
intervention’ and an obsession with ‘national 
sovereignty’,4 so it articulates a new interven-
tionism in defence of democratisation, account-
able governance and human rights. According to 
former Mozambican President Joaquim Alberto 
Chissano, African leaders ‘are busy developing 
and strengthening, enabling a political, econom-
ic, legal and institutional environment for their 
own citizens …’.5
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The ‘New’ Africans: A Background
The ‘new’ pan-Africanism puts interventionism 
firmly on the agenda. African leaders such as 
South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki, Nigeria’s Olusegun 
Obasanjo, Algeria’s Abdulaziz Bou teflika, 
Mozambique’s Joachim Chissano, Ghana’s John 
Kuofor, Ethiopia’s Meles Zenawi, Tanzania’s 
Benjamin Mkapa, Senegal’s Abdu laye Wade, 
and others have all helped shape this new agen-
da. In particular, Thabo Mbeki and his Nigerian 
counterpart, Olusegun Oba sanjo, emerged as 
central actors seeking to put in place punitive 
measures against unconstitutional changes of 
government in Africa; this move against coups 
d’état was a bid to entrench democratic norms 
of governance. These two AU leaders and their 
allies borrowed soccer terminology in invoking 
a ‘yellow’ and ‘red’ card threat analogy which 
said that in the event of a coup the putschists 
would first be warned and urged to return to 
democratic rule – the yellow card. In the event of 
a failure to comply, such regimes would then be 
expelled from the OAU and face other punitive 
sanctions – the red card. The OAU subsequently 
barred the military regimes of Côte d’Ivoire and 
Comoros from attending its summit in Lomé in 
2000 as the idea of ‘sovereignty as responsibili-
ty’ increasingly took root in African diplomacy.6
During the period 2000–2001, the process of 
restructuring Africa’s governance architecture 
crystallised when four leading African states 
– South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal and Algeria – 
and their continental partners undertook eight 
initiatives filled with new, and at times radical, 
policy directives:7
 ● The Africa renaissance
 ● The Conference on Security, Stability, 
Development and Cooperation in Africa and 
its formal incorporation into the OAU’s con-
flict prevention, management and resolution 
machinery (established in 1930)
 ● The decision taken in Lomé in 1999 by the 
OAU to transform itself into the AU
 ● The acceleration of the OAU-mandated 
drafting of the Millennium Africa Recovery 
Plan (MAP) under the leadership of Mbeki, 
Obasanjo and Bouteflika
 ● The merger of the MAP and the Omega Plan 
(the initiative spearheaded by Senegalese 
president Abdoulaye Wade) to create the 
New Africa Initiative
 ● The launch of the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD)
 ● The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)
 ● Africa’s quest for a partnership with the in-
dustrialised world through seeking strategic 
relations with the G8 and other actors
The design and construction of these eight pol-
icy initiatives have formed the crux of the ‘new’ 
African architecture. All these policy ordinanc-
es propose a major restructuring of Africa’s de-
velopment, governance, and peace and security 
ethos; they come out in defence of intervention 
in the domestic affairs of states in four particu-
lar instances:8
1. Genocide
2. Gross violations of human rights
3. Instability in one country which threatens 
broader regional stability
4. Unconstitutional changes of government
There has thus been a proposed break with 
the past; however, it is clear 10 years later 
that successfully implementing this new inter-
ventionism will require political commitment 
from states – a coalition of the willing, so to 
speak. It will require member states to form a 
consortium to act in defence of the new regime. 
Indeed, the continent is bound to experience a 
major implementation crisis over the next few 
decades, so while the policy designs and scope 
have been sorted out, there is little guarantee 
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that the continent will be successful at opera-
tionalising and implementing these new policy 
programmes and plans. The current crop of 
African leaders is thus tasked with placing the 
emphasis on operationalisation of the execu-
tion of policy.
Key actors have openly stated that they fa-
vour ‘an Africa’ that can be ‘critical’ about ‘its 
own weaknesses’.9 The new architecture will 
depend heavily on political will; human and fi-
nancial resources; respect for new norms, val-
ues and principles; the strengthening of new 
institutions; intra-African cooperation; and the 
forging of new strategic partnerships between 
Africa and the outside world (notably the indus-
trialised powers and the continent), among oth-
er things. In the words of the former chairperson 
of the AU Commission, Professor Alpha Konare,
[t]he resources that we need for the integrated 
Africa to become a force to be reckoned with, a 
force that we can all rely upon, include among 
other things, the political will to achieve in-
tegration, the leadership and commitment of 
the Commission, the accession of the people to 
the integration endeavour, the optimal use of 
all our assets (namely our population, culture, 
languages, dialogue, economies, and human 
and financial resources).10
The problem is that, 10 years since the AU’s 
inception, many of these fundamentals are in 
short supply on the continent, and this inad-
equacy will negatively impact on the chances of 
successful implementation.
A Radically Altered African 
Policy Landscape
The policy landscape inherited by the new 
pan-Africanism is characterised by poverty, 
underdevelopment and massive socioeconomic 
challenges. This landscape is further compli-
cated by wars and deadly conflicts in some 
parts of the continent. Africa has experienced 
more wars and violent conflicts than any other 
region or continent.11 Poor people are typically 
marginalised and excluded from the policy, 
decision-making and governance process in 
Africa.12 By the time of the AU’s creation, the 
economies of the continent had seriously un-
derperformed, and therefore failed to produce 
the necessary growth and resources needed for 
development.13
Given this policy context, great emphasis 
has been placed on integration processes, es-
pecially at sub-regional levels. Integration bod-
ies such as the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU), the Common Market 
for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), the 
AU, and programmes like NEPAD have all cru-
cial roles to play in this regard,14 yet there ap-
pears to be little interest on the part of African 
leaders to re-establish and restore the credibil-
ity and importance of these institutions and 
programmes.
Put simply, regional integration is the im-
pulse toward creating a common approach, 
replete with institutions, by states in a region 
around economic, political or social issues. It is 
about liberation and self-determination, peace 
and security, and development. Integration is 
transformatory, and calls for a radical approach 
to bringing together disparate states.15 This 
transformation depends heavily on regional co-
hesion in securing societal integration within 
a region – it builds regional awareness and 
identity. It requires interstate cooperation and 
coordination in a region. Regional cooperation, 
however, should not be confused with regional 
integration and unification as it is merely part 
of the process that leads to this. The question 
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could legitimately be asked as to whether the 
continent’s leaders are committed to integra-
tion or whether they prefer piecemeal efforts of 
cooperation.
Regional integration seeks to move beyond 
nation-state identities in order to develop new 
and common regional identities and citizen-
ships. It leads to the emergence of cohesive 
and consolidated regional units.16 Its ultimate 
goal is the creation of a single regional enti-
ty, such as one southern African bloc, out of 
many disparate groups. Real integration does 
not just mean the amalgamation of the vari-
ous economies in the region; its longer-term 
goals must of necessity include a common 
citizenship, such as a southern African citi-
zenship, and thus the free movement of both 
goods and people. Political integration, as wit-
nessed in the EU, is an even longer-term goal 
of this process and is perhaps the most diffi-
cult aspect to achieve.
Regional integration is about states agree-
ing to live by common norms and values, the 
deepening of cooperation, the creation of com-
mon markets, the free movement of people in a 
region, and ultimately the creation of a shared 
governance architecture, replete with legisla-
tive and other governance competencies for the 
region. There is need for greater urgency to be 
demonstrated by African leaders to take inte-
gration far more seriously.
One of the threats to successful regional in-
tegration on the African continent, especially in 
sub-Saharan Africa, is the HIV/AIDS pandemic, 
added to which is the continued economic dif-
ficulty. The region is confronted with a plethora 
of enormous developmental challenges. While 
in recent years economic growth rates in the 
region have reached levels of between 2 and 8 
per cent, the promise of great economic growth 
in the region was originally overstated, and of 
late there has been a serious race for access to 
Africa’s resources under the banner of Africa as 
the ‘new gateway’.
Many states have been compelled to be-
come part of the cycle of ‘donor democracy’ in 
which most of their national budgets are sup-
plied by donors, thus leaving them wide open 
to pressure, persuasion and the dictates of the 
donors at whose mercy their fragile economies 
lie. Many are forced to pursue economic policies 
dictated by these donors and termed by many 
analysts as ‘neo-liberal’. This has, more often 
than not, not resulted in sustainable growth 
paths in these countries. Even in countries 
where economic growth rates have been high, 
such growth typically has been off a low base. 
From a governance perspective, poor economic 
performance exacerbates poverty and com-
pounds the daunting development challenges. 
Both these factors impact negatively on pros-
pects for regional integration.
HIV/AIDS threatens the populace of states 
in the region – impacting even on the military 
and governance machinery in potential mem-
ber states, and threatening to spill over into 
neighbouring states with the free movement 
of goods and people that regional integration 
brings. Similarly, economic meltdown in one 
or more states in a region may be viewed as a 
threat by prospective member states that are 
more economically balanced, as they may fear 
being flooded by economic refugees from these 
countries moving freely across borders in such 
a regional community. Xenophobia and other 
interstate tensions that could result from this 
may well threaten the prospect of regional in-
tegration. Ironically, however, regional inte-
gration may well be the cure for both of these 
‘threats’ to regional integration. A coordinated 
regional approach to combating HIV/AIDS may 
be the most effective way to fight the pandemic, 
while an integrated economic bloc à la the EU 
may well be the best way to create economic 
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growth, not just in one state, but in an entire 
economic community.
A New Institutional Architecture
In some quarters, the AU has been made out 
to be little more than the ‘OAU without the O’, 
suggesting that it was going to be business as 
usual. There are however real and fundamen-
tal differences between the two organisations. 
Whereas the OAU enjoyed a single source of au-
thority – the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government – the AU enjoys multiple ones. 
In reality, the OAU was little more than a col-
laboration of governments of sovereign states, 
and placed a huge emphasis on ‘national sov-
ereignty’ as being paramount.17 It did not take 
kindly to interference in the internal affairs of 
states, and did not even question in public the 
actions of other governments. It did not show 
seriousness to the pooling of sovereignty, and 
its prime objective was a collective struggle for 
national liberation from colonialism and the 
defence of national sovereignty. As the OAU 
subscribed to an ‘intergovernmental approach’, 
the secretary-general was tasked with carrying 
out the decisions of heads of state.
 While the OAU had one single source of au-
thority, the AU opted for a more democratised 
approach. It enjoys multiple sources of author-
ity, including the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government, a judicial court, and a demo-
cratic institution in the form of the Pan-African 
Parliament (PAP). While the AU subscribes 
to the doctrine of respect for internal author-
ity and sovereignty, it also endorses a ‘right to 
intervene in grave circumstances’, including 
making provisions to suspend governments 
that come to power unconstitutionally, as well 
as those governments who commit gross vio-
lations of human rights, such as mass murder 
and genocide.18 In a bold and innovative move, 
the AU came up with an innovative govern-
ance promotion mechanism – the African Peer 
Review Mechanism (ARPM) – to encourage 
African states to live by common governance 
standards.19 The overall decision-making ethos 
as subscribed to by the AU, as well as promoted 
in mechanisms like the APRM, was that of col-
legiality and quiet diplomacy. The AU agreed to 
establish a number of political, legal and demo-
cratic organs.20
 ● The Assembly of the Union, the supreme 
organ of the AU, is composed of heads of 
state and government or their duly accred-
ited representatives. This organ meets at 
least once annually in an extraordinary ses-
sion.
 ● The Commission of the African Union is 
the secretariat of the AU. It is composed of 
the chairperson, his or her deputy, and com-
missioners. It represents the AU, and de-
fends its interests under the direction of the 
Assembly and the Executive Council. It can 
initiate proposals for submission to the oth-
er organs of the AU, and executes decisions 
taken by it. It assists member states in ex-
ecuting the policies and programmes of the 
AU, particularly the Conference on Security, 
Stability, Development and Cooperation in 
Africa (CSSDCA) and NEPAD. It formulates 
common positions of the AU, and coordi-
nates the work of member states during in-
ternational negotiations.
 ● The Executive Council, composed of for-
eign ministers or other such ministers or 
representatives as are designated by the 
governments of member states, is respon-
sible for coordinating and taking decisions 
on policies in areas of common interest to 
member states.
 ● The Permanent Representatives’ Commit­
tee, composed of permanent representatives 
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or other plenipotentiaries of member states, 
is responsible for preparing the work of the 
Executive Council and acting on its instruc-
tions.
 ● The Peace and Security Council is com-
posed of 15 member states, and is responsi-
ble for the promotion of peace, security and 
stability in Africa, preventive diplomacy and 
the restoration of peace. It is also responsi-
ble for disaster management and humani-
tarian activities. It is expected to replace 
the Central Organ of the Conflict Prevention, 
Management and Resolution Mechanism 
established in 1993 by the heads of state 
at the Tunis Summit. To enable it to dis-
charge its responsibilities with respect to 
deployment of peace support missions and 
interventions in the event of genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, the 
Peace and Security Council may consult a 
Panel of the Wise composed of five African 
personalities, and mobilise a standby force.
 ● The Pan­African Parliament will be uni-
cameral but representative of all parlia-
ments of the countries of Africa. It will 
adopt legislation agreed to by a two-thirds 
majority of its members, and will be com-
posed of five members per country, at least 
one of which is a woman.
 ● The African Court of Justice, which will 
adjudicate in civil cases, will be responsible 
for the protection of human rights and the 
monitoring of human rights violations. It 
will also constitute itself into a real crimi-
nal court in the long term.
 ● The Economic, Social and Cultural Council 
is an advisory organ composed of different 
social and professional groups from mem-
ber states of the AU, particularly youth and 
women’s associations.
 ● The African Court of Human and People’s 
Rights adopted at the Ouagadougou Summit 
in 1998, has jurisdiction in cases of hu-
man rights violation by any state party, the 
African Commission on Human and People’s 
Rights, and African intergovernmental or-
ganisations. The court can hear cases filed 
by individuals and non-governmental or-
ganisations with observer status in the AU 
when the state party concerned makes a 
declaration to this effect. It is composed of 
11 judges elected by the Assembly for a man-
date of six years renewable once only.
 ● The Three Financial Institutions are the 
African Central Bank, the African Monetary 
Fund and the Investment Bank.
 ● Specialised Technical Committees are 
composed of ministers or senior officials 
responsible for the sectors falling within 
their respective areas of competence. Seven 
Technical Committees, the number and com-
position of which are not limited, are pro-
vided for in the Constitutive Act of the AU:
●● The Committee on Rural Economy and 
Agriculture
●● The Committee on Monetary and Finan-
cial Matters
●● The Committee on Trade, Customs and 
Immigration Matters
●● The Committee on Industry, Science and 
Technology, Energy, Natural Resources 
and Environment
●● The Committee on Transport, Commu-
nications and Tourism
●● The Committee on Health, Labour and 
Social Affairs
●● The Committee on Education, Culture 
and Human Resources
The above confirms that there has been a 
policy, norms and institutions revolution in 
Africa. The challenge now and into the future 
is to place the emphasis on implementation and 
operationalization.
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Major Challenges
There is no gainsaid that the AU has faced 
many institutional changes during the course 
of its first decade of existence, so while there 
has been an unprecedented policy revolution in 
Africa, spearheaded by the AU and key states, 
the AU has also been beset with major insti-
tutional and organisational crises. The former 
commissioner for political affairs at the AU 
Commission in Addis Ababa, Julia Dolly Joiner, 
said in this regard that ‘the challenges … are 
essentially at two levels. The first relates to in-
stitutional capacity and the second to strategic 
orientation’.21 ‘At the overall strategic orienta-
tion’, she continued, ‘it goes without saying 
that there is always tension between the appli-
cation of shared values and the particularities 
and specificities of each member state.’22 These 
challenges ranged from human resource issues, 
clinging to old-style sovereignty, relations with 
civil society, and weak regional economic com-
munities (RECs) and other institutions.
Personnel and Financial Challenges
Notwithstanding the fundamental overhaul 
of the policy landscape in Africa over the past 
decade, the transition from the OAU to the AU 
remains a complex and challenging process, 
especially with regard to human and financial 
resources, and in terms of setting policy pri-
orities. The AU continues to face the challenge 
of increasing, professionalising and equipping 
its staff with the necessary skills while simul-
taneously making its structures effective and 
efficient. Moreover, there were major tensions 
between the AU and NEPAD over integrating 
the latter into the former.23 Because of these 
tensions, NEPAD, like the AU, also has staffing 
and human resources problems because NEPAD 
has put all such policy and procedural matters, 
such as appointing staff and creating neces-
sary structures, on hold because of uncertainty 
deriving from the NEPAD/AU tensions.
Limited financial resources, especially for 
the AU and sub-regional organisations, re-
mains a major problem impacting on all facets 
of these institutions’ operations. The AU, for ex-
ample, has inherited huge financial shortfalls. 
Many member states do not pay their dues in 
full and/or on time, and this creates huge fi-
nancial problems for the AU. While some cash-
strapped states are incapable of paying, many 
others, who continue to contribute their dues to 
the UN and other international organisations, 
lack the political will or interest to pay their 
AU dues. Consequently, the institutions remain 
heavily dependent on donor funding, and this 
allows foreigners to dictate policy in ways that 
suit their interests instead of those of the conti-
nent. Such dependency, especially if it becomes 
entrenched, can be detrimental to the interests 
of an African-inspired and -owned agenda.
A challenge for the AU and sub-regional 
organisations is to make it worth the while of 
member states to pay their dues. They must be 
seen to be getting value for their money, which 
means that the AU will have to begin seriously 
to operationalise its lofty protocols, agendas 
and ideals – moving them from the realm of 
promises and vision to that of reality on the 
ground. It will have to accomplish this if it is 
to finally break with the image associated with 
its predecessor, the OAU, and it remains one of 
the continental body’s most challenging tasks.
The RECs are regarded as the implementing 
agents of the new continental architecture and 
have been dubbed the building blocks of the 
AU, yet all of them, without fail, face serious 
financial constraints, and struggle to execute 
their ambitious policy mandates. Many RECs 
are also jealous of their status as older, and 
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more experienced than the AU, and are reluc-
tant to cede leadership to it. This has resulted 
in something of a power struggle between RECs 
and the AU.
Challenges of Implementation
In addition to the challenge of acquiring the 
necessary human and financial resources, and 
building new institutions, Africa continues to 
grapple, among other things, with problems of 
peace building, democratic governance and de-
velopment. One of the most serious challenges 
facing the AU Commission is that of closing the 
gap between the formulation of policy and treaty 
commitments and their actual implementation 
and operationalisation.24 Indeed, the OAU had 
long faced a crisis of implementation, and a seri-
ous risk still exists that, over the next four years, 
the AU Commission could find itself bogged 
down by a backlog of unimplemented decisions.
Challenges of Unity and Sovereignty
There is clearly a major contradiction here. On 
the one hand, greater development and a de-
velopmental paradigm require the continent to 
foster unity among its divergent states. Another 
gap that must be closed is the challenge of the 
continent in marshalling its disparate institu-
tional voices so that it can begin to speak with 
a common and unified voice on key develop-
ment challenges. However, many governments 
remain reluctant to empower the Commission 
with such powers and responsibilities, and a 
majority of African governments still cling to 
old-style sovereignty.25 The Commission should 
therefore brace itself for a continuation of ten-
sions between itself and some governments in 
this regard, as it will continue to face a struggle 
to convince governments to cede sovereignty 
for the common good.
Many African states remain jealous of their 
sovereignty and are not keen to surrender or 
even pool some of it. So, although member 
states have ratified the Constitutive Act, the 
risk remains that many governments would 
prefer the status quo to remain even at the risk 
of creating a weak AU. Some misunderstanding 
also seems to exist in the general public over 
the status of the AU and its constitutive bodies. 
Is the AU a supranational body or an intergov-
ernmental organisation?
Relations with RECs
The relationship between the AU and Africa’s 
regional economic organisations remains some-
what ambiguous, and at times contentious, in 
spite of a protocol signed by the OAU and five 
of the existing RECs. A joint Centre for Conflict 
Resolution-African Centre for Development and 
Strategic Studies (ACDESS) report of 2010 ar-
gues that, ‘each of Africa’s regional economic 
communities (RECs) has its own interests and 
agendas, which can obstruct effective co-oper-
ation within and between these bodies’.26 There 
is, first of all, a proliferation of regional bodies, 
many with overlapping and sometimes con-
tradictory mandates, roles and memberships. 
Presently, there are at least 40 different regional 
bodies in Africa, all with their own economic 
integration and security arrangements. This 
state of affairs often creates confusion, so the 
need for a harmonisation of efforts cannot be 
overemphasised. However, the possibility can-
not be ruled out that some of the better-re-
sourced RECs – such as SADC and ECOWAS – 
will fiercely protect their autonomy, and many, 
including the weaker and less well-organised 
RECs, may resist the Commission’s involvement 
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in decision-making and operational matters in 
their region.
The AU’s protocol relating to the Peace and 
Security Council calls for defining relations and 
rationalising the organisation’s links with the 
RECs. However, this may be a difficult task, 
not least because the existing regional security 
arrangements have been set up and mandated 
by a decision of their heads of state and gov-
ernment. Furthermore, the protocol relating 
to the PSC was signed much later than earlier 
regional pacts and agreements on peace and 
security, such as the ECOWAS security mecha-
nism of 1999 and the SADC Organ on Politics, 
Defence and Security Cooperation of 2001. 
Harmonisation is therefore a sine qua non, but 
competition and a certain amount of rivalry 
should be expected.
Relations with Civil Society
The 2010 joint CCR-ACDESS report observed that 
‘…relations between states and their societies 
should be urgently addressed, and in particular, 
the gap between elites and their masses nar-
rowed’.27 This report implored that ‘viable social 
contracts between leaders and citizens should 
also be developed. The economic transforma-
tion of Africa depends on the establishment of 
effective local governance at the grassroots lev-
el. Citizens should be empowered, and political 
processes to enable the full participation of all 
sectors of society should be strengthened’.28
While many of the AU’s as well as NEPAD’s 
and the APRM’s provisions makes lofty com-
mitments to the idea of popular and civil soci-
ety participation, the commitments of member 
states and the institutions that have been set 
up for such participation have remained weak. 
Certainly, many new opportunities for civil 
society engagement have been created by the 
new architecture, and NGOs and CSOs have 
often been poorly organised to take up these 
challenges. But this does not detract from the 
fact that the real strength and success of the 
AU, NEPAD and other continental initiatives 
will be determined by the extent to which they 
empower people and create opportunities for 
them to improve their lives. In future, the AU, 
NEPAD, APRM, PAP and other structures, in-
stitutions and programmes will continue to be 
tested on the basis of the impact they have on 
the lives of ordinary African citizens. Indeed, if 
they wish to build their credibility in the eyes 
of the African populace at large, they will have 
to begin to show that they can be sources for 
the betterment of their lives – not just economi-
cally, although this is very important – but also 
in the human rights, peace-making, peacekeep-
ing and democratic governance realms.
The establishment of the Economic, Social 
and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) as a unit of 
the CSSDCA tasked with civil society issues 
within the AU Commission was not sufficiently 
staffed and equipped to perform its catalytic 
role more effectively. The Commission was also 
ill-prepared to help overcome the apprehension 
illustrated by several African governments to-
wards civil society actors. NEPAD’s civil soci-
ety structures remained decidedly weak, and 
its operatives seem more interested in invit-
ing civil society participation during imple-
mentation processes, and not in actual poli-
cymaking, design and construction processes. 
Deliberative policy-making opportunities in the 
AU were thus poorly constructed, protestations 
to the contrary notwithstanding. It is needless 
to point out that it is imperative for the AU to 
appreciate that stakeholder participation is re-
quired during all stages of the policymaking 
and governance processes if buy-in and owner-
ship are to be ensured, and if the AU is to be-
come a more people-centred continental body.
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But there is also a responsibility that rests 
on the shoulders of African CSOs to become 
more engaging if democratic governance proc-
esses are to take firm root in Africa. These non-
state actors should not expect governments 
to invite them in, as it is not in the nature of 
African governments to share power with such 
actors. NGOs will have to become more proac-
tive in engaging the AU, NEPAD, the APRM, 
RECs and other AU organs.
The AU Commission and the recently elect-
ed chairperson, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, 
should now make it a strategic imperative to re-
engage African non-state actors to assist with 
capacity building for the engagement of the 
continental architecture.
Conclusion
The AU has no doubt been in the forefront of 
spearheading a policy and norms revolution on 
the continent, but it has been embroiled in an 
institutional crisis of implementation and op-
erationalisation. Translating policy into action, 
and getting the member states to take AU provi-
sions seriously and to live by newly articulated 
values and principles, has been an uphill battle. 
Even RECs and other organs and programmes 
have faced serious institution-building chal-
lenges. These bodies had been tasked with tak-
ing the lead in establishing new institutions 
and organs, and overhauling weak structures, 
while simultaneously establishing their own 
structures and building up their own financial 
and human resource bases and communications 
strategies. However, due to a combination of 
factors, ranging from weak leadership to weak 
financial and human resource bases, as well as 
being torn between internal institutional reform 
and external demands by member states, they 
have not been able to live up to expectations. 
In short, a major part of the narrative of the 
AU has been a gap between policy and imple-
mentation, and in the decade to follow the AU 
will have to demonstrate the necessary agency 
and leadership to tackle this problem head on. 
As newly elected chairperson of the AU, Dr 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma,29 stated:
I believe that more can be done to make the 
AU fulfil the mandate given to it by our fore-
bears. We need to continue to build the commis-
sion into a formidable, pan-African institution 
that is at the selfless service of the continent.
One way forward for the new chairperson 
is to inculcate into the AU Commission a po-
litical culture that would move from rhetoric 
to action.
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